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Discouraging Voluntary Disclosure: EEOC v. C.R. 
England and Confidentiality Under the ADA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), employers 
who ask for disability information must keep it confidential.1 
However, the statute is silent as to whether employers must also 
keep voluntary disclosures confidential.2  
James Kingston had been working as a supervisor for The Ford 
Meter Box Company for three years before he was diagnosed with 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.3 This disease progressively 
made his breathing more difficult when he performed any sort of 
physical labor, even walking short distances.4 After his diagnosis, he 
disclosed his illness to the plant nurse, who gave him information 
about requesting medical leave.5 After his supervisor requested that 
Kingston spend more time on the production floor, Kingston 
responded by telling him about his condition, but he did not ask for 
any accommodations at that time.6 
Because his disease continued to worsen in the year after his 
diagnosis, Kingston had a meeting with the plant nurse and his 
supervisor to discuss accommodations.7 He requested at this time 
that they keep his condition confidential.8 Although his supervisor 
told him at this time that Kingston could send his assistant to 
meetings that were located up a floor and across the plant, later 
conversations with his supervisor made him feel “compelled to go 
the meetings,” so he did his best to attend rather than send his 
assistant.9 Other coworkers told him that his condition was a topic of 
conversation at a production meeting that he did not attend.10 When 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2006). 
 2. See id. 
 3. Kingston v. Ford Meter Box Co., No. 3:07-CV-270 RM, 2009 WL 981333, at *1 
(N.D. Ind. Apr. 10, 2009). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at *2. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. However, the court notes that the defendant filed affidavits contradicting 
Kingston’s assertion that other coworkers talked about his condition at a meeting. Id. at *3 
JONES - JESSICA.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  11:55 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
560 
Kingston brought a lawsuit for disability discrimination, the court 
held that because he had told his supervisor and the plant nurse 
about his condition voluntarily before requesting reasonable 
accommodations, his medical information was not protected under 
the ADA.11 Thus, the court implied that employees who proactively 
tell employers about potential problems are not protected, but 
instead must wait until their job performance suffers, prompting 
their employers to initiate a disability inquiry or request medical 
documents.12 
In a similar case, EEOC v. C.R. England,13 the Tenth Circuit 
held that the ADA does not protect an employee’s disclosures to his 
supervisor. Rather than rewarding a proactive employee for telling 
his supervisor before his condition became a problem, C.R. England 
required the employee to divulge his medical condition to others and 
restricted his actions. This opinion will discourage voluntary 
discourse about disabilities between employees and employers, 
departing from Congress’s intent in enacting the ADA. This Note 
argues that although the ADA does not directly address voluntary 
disclosures of medical information, the Tenth Circuit should have 
interpreted the ADA to protect employees’ voluntary disclosures 
even where the employer has not made a special inquiry about the 
disability. 
Part II of this Note first discusses the applicable ADA provisions, 
their legislative history, and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission’s enforcement regulations and guidance. Next, Part III 
examines case law leading up to EEOC v. C.R. England, and 
discusses the difficulty in determining whether a disclosure is actually 
voluntary. As will be apparent from this discussion, the slight 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary disclosures does not 
justify the differences in outcome. Part IV discusses the facts and the 
Tenth Circuit’s analysis in EEOC v. C.R. England. Part V argues that 
the Tenth Circuit’s holding is contrary to Congress’s intent in 
passing the ADA, contrary to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission’s guidance, and discourages voluntary employee 
disclosures through bad workplace policy that encourages both 
employees and employers to remain silent about disabilities, thus 
 
n.3. 
 11. Id. at *11. 
 12. See id. at *9–10 (distinguishing cases holding that the employer initiated the inquiry 
and thus was legally bound to keep the information confidential). 
 13. 644 F.3d 1028 (10th Cir. 2011). 
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leading to a less productive disabled workforce. Part VI proposes two 
possible solutions: voluntary disclosures about possible disabilities 
could be treated like confidential medical records under the ADA; 
Or in the alternative, information could be disclosed only when 
“job-related and consistent with business necessity.”14 Part VII 
concludes. 
II. SECTION 12112(D) OF THE ADA AND THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF 
MEDICAL INFORMATION 
A. The ADA and What the Legislature Intended 
The ADA was meant to herald a new day of understanding for 
people with disabilities and allow them “the opportunity to compete 
on an equal basis with others.”15 Prior to the statute, people with 
disabilities had been segregated from regular society, treated as 
worthless or nonexistent, and discriminated against solely on the 
basis of their disabilities.16 The legislative history recounted Judith 
Heumann’s experience, where her elementary school forbade her 
from attending and entertainment venues asked her to leave because 
she was confined to a wheelchair.17 Some employers refused to offer 
jobs to qualified applicants with disabilities, even where the applicant 
did not need accommodations and had a “hidden,” or not obviously 
visible, disability.18 Some individuals were discriminated against even 
though they did not consider themselves disabled.19 The public 
associated disability with ineptness, leading many disabled individuals 
 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c) (2011). 
 15. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 22–23, 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304, 310. (“The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities and 
to bring persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life; to 
provide enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities, 
and to ensure that the Federal government plays a central role in enforcing these standards on 
behalf of individuals with disabilities.”). 
 16. Id. at 28–29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 310–11. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 72, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 355. Individuals with a history of or 
who were successfully treating “hidden” disabilities, such as diabetes, epilepsy, or many 
emotional or mental illnesses, could still be required to disclose their conditions on job 
applications before Congress passed the ADA. Id. 
 19. Congress drafted the ADA broadly enough to encompass these individuals, stating 
that disability is defined independently of any “mitigating measures” taken by the individual, 
and that those individuals stigmatized by a past history of a disability—even if they physically 
no longer have it—are also covered under the ADA. Id. at 52–53, reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334–35. 
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to be under-employed, unnecessarily dependent on others, or 
indigent.20 
Congress passed the ADA to ameliorate these problems. Section 
12112 of the ADA forbids employment discrimination: “No covered 
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of 
disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, 
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.”21 The statute regulates employers’ inquiries about 
disabilities at all stages of employment, including before the 
employment offer, after the offer, and after the person is an 
employee.22 Employers can inquire only whether an employee can 
physically perform the job, an inquiry that can take the form of a 
physical or an employer-instigated inquiry into an employee’s 
medical history if “job-related and consistent with business 
necessity.”23 This inquiry must be about a person’s ability to perform 
“job-related functions”24 and cannot extend specifically to a person’s 
disabled status.25 Employers may also make “voluntary medical 
examinations” available in conjunction with “an employee health 
program available to all employees at that work site.”26 
When an employer obtains health information through these 
allowed methods, it must be “maintained on separate forms and in 
separate medical files and is treated as a confidential medical 
record.”27 But the information can be shared with supervisors to 
inform them of “necessary restrictions” and “necessary 
accommodations,” with “first aid and safety personnel” in case of 
emergency, and with government officials to show compliance with 
the ADA.28 
 
 20. Id. at 32–33, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314–15. 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006). 
 22. Id. § 12112(d). 
 23. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A). 
 24. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(B). 
 25. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A). 
 26. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(B). This provision was meant to include jobs that require regular 
physicals or that offer health exams due to hazards found on the job site. H.R. REP. NO. 101-
485(II), at 74–75 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 356–58. 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B). 
 28. Id. Practitioners have also added two other instances where the information may be 
shared. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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B. EEOC Guidelines Regarding Disability Inquiries 
The Tenth Circuit’s opinion conflicts with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission’s interpretation of the ADA. 
Congress authorized the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) to broadly implement and enforce the ADA 
employment provisions.29 To provide clarity to employers wishing to 
abide by these provisions, the EEOC promulgated guidelines to 
provide notice to employers about what kinds of inquiries are 
acceptable under the ADA.30 The EEOC guidelines first emphasize 
the aim of the ADA to “protect the rights of applicants and 
employees to be assessed on merit alone, while protecting the rights 
of employers to ensure that individuals in the workplace can 
efficiently perform the essential functions of their jobs.”31 The 
guidelines stress that any medical exams and inquiries must be “job-
related and consistent with business necessity.”32 Notably, the 
guidelines state that while employers must keep confidential any 
information gained from employer-initiated disability inquiries, 
employers are also required to protect any medical information 
voluntarily disclosed by an employee33—an area the statute does not 
clearly address.34 Thus, the EEOC guidelines implement a 
straightforward standard that is easy to understand and apply.   
III. CASE LAW ON VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES 
Although most courts have held that voluntary disclosures are 
not protected by the ADA, courts disagree on what constitutes a 
voluntary disclosure. This suggests that courts should discard the 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary disclosures and simply 
protect all medical information. Only two circuit courts have ruled 
on the issue, and numerous district courts have defined voluntary 
disclosures with varying success. None of these decisions have 
addressed Congress’s intent in passing the ADA or the EEOC’s 
determination that there should be no difference between medical  
 
 
 29.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (2011). 
 30. Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of 
Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html (last visited February 1, 2012). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2006). 
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information gained through an employer inquiry and medical 
information given voluntarily. 
Some courts have held that the confidentiality provisions were 
meant to be a strict ceiling. In Ballard v. Healthsouth Corp., a court 
interpreted the ADA confidentiality provisions narrowly and held 
that an employer need not keep disability information confidential if 
an employer discovers that information through any means outside 
of an employer-initiated exam or inquiry.35 Thus, when the employee 
in Ballard told his supervisor about his HIV, the ADA did not apply 
since the voluntary disclosure of disability “is not a matter that the 
ADA was designed to handle.”36 
However, not all courts have interpreted the statute this 
narrowly. This strict-ceiling interpretation was directly criticized in 
Lanxon v. Crete Carrier Corp.37 In this case, an employer’s medical 
review officer “found out about” an employee’s seizures and 
informed other employees through phone calls and emails about her 
condition.38 The judge criticized any reliance on the Ballard 
holding, since it would suggest that information gained through an 
ADA-prohibited inquiry would not need to be kept confidential 
because the information had not been gained as part of a legal 
inquiry.39 If those inquiries had been “job-related and consistent 
with business necessity,” then they may have been permissible under 
the ADA.40 The judge further reasoned that the employer “had no 
right to obtain the information in the first place” when it was gained 
outside of employer-initiated inquiries or voluntary wellness 
programs, implying that information gained outside of those 
methods should be protected even more strictly.41 
Most courts continue to follow the strict ceiling reasoning found 
in Ballard, holding that employers are not liable for disclosing 
medical information to other employees, even where the employee 
discloses a condition when requesting medical leave to treat it.42 In 
Ross v. Advance America Cash Advance Centers, Inc., an employee 
 
 35. 147 F. Supp. 2d 529, 534–35 (N.D. Tex. 2001). 
 36. Id. at 535. 
 37. No. 4:00CV3182, 2001 WL 1589627 at *11 (D. Neb. Dec. 13, 2001). 
 38. Id. at *1–2. 
 39. Id. at *11. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. E.g., Walker v. Gambrell, 647 F. Supp. 2d 529, 539 n.5 (D. Md. 2009); see also 
Kingston v. Ford Meter Box Co., 3:07-CV-270 RM, 2009 WL 981333 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 10, 
2009). 
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called her supervisor to ask for time off so that she could start taking 
medication for her bipolar disorder, for which she was recently 
diagnosed.43 The supervisor then discussed her diagnosis with at least 
one other employee.44 The district court reasoned that while the 
supervisor’s actions were “ill-mannered,” mostly because the 
voluntarily disclosed information involved mental illness, the ADA 
does not protect self-disclosures.45 Rather than err on the side of 
protecting medical information, the court reasoned that it is an 
everyday occurrence for an employee to call a supervisor, explain the 
medical reason for an absence, and then for the supervisor to tell 
everyone else in the workplace, whether or not the information 
could be sensitive.46 
Where an employer requests documents detailing medical 
information, courts are split on whether the confidentiality 
provisions of the ADA cover that information. In Cash v. Smith—an 
Eleventh Circuit case and the only other federal circuit case handling 
this issue—an employee told her supervisor in confidence about a 
number of health problems.47 The employee supplied her supervisor, 
upon the employer’s request, with medical documents detailing her 
medical conditions.48 The supervisor later told other employees 
about Cash’s medical conditions.49 Because the employee initiated 
this inquiry by informing her employer about her medical condition, 
 
 43. 605 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1033 (E.D. Ark. 2009). 
 44. Id. at 1028. 
 45. Id. at 1033–34. 
 46. Id. at 1033 (“An employee may take leave due to influenza, a stomach virus, a 
broken leg, cancer, congestive heart failure, or some other medical condition and inform the 
employer of that medical condition; and when that happens it is common for the information 
to be spread around the workplace. Nothing in the statute or the cases gives reason to believe 
that the ADA prohibits that kind of disclosure.”). But see H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 75 
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 357–58 (observing that cancer sufferers are 
often seen as having a disability, so their medical condition may also be a sensitive matter that 
they would not want spread around the workplace). 
 47. 231 F.3d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 48. Id. at 1304, 1307. Even though Cash’s medical conditions were not held to be a 
disability because they were managed through medications, the interpretation of the ADA has 
changed so that mitigating measures are not taken into consideration when deciding if 
someone has a disability. See WILLIAM D. GOREN, UNDERSTANDING THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT 138 (3d ed. 2010) (setting out checklists for trying ADA cases that 
differentiate between cases before or after Jan. 1, 2009). 
 49. Cash, 231 F.3d at 1308. This case is not always the best confidentiality case because 
Cash also told others in the office besides her supervisor about her condition, thus 
contradicting her later claim that she wanted to keep her medical condition a secret. Since the 
court only examined whether she voluntarily gave the information to her supervisor in making 
its holding, Cash’s decision to tell other employees did not impact its holding. 
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the court held that her condition did not have to be kept 
confidential.50  This holding contrasts with the holding in Doe v. U.S. 
Postal Service, where a supervisor required an employee to submit a 
medical certification form to request time off.51 Although the 
employee voluntarily submitted the form, the court held that the 
employer’s request for the medical leave certification form was 
effectively a “job-related” inquiry, and thus that the information 
should have been kept confidential according to the ADA.52  
Even if viewed in terms of the timeline for the employer requests, 
the difference between voluntary disclosures and employer requests is 
very narrow. In both cases, the employer requested information from 
the employee. In Cash, the employee requested accommodation 
first; then her employer asked for her medical records.53 In Doe, the 
employee had to turn in a medical certification form in order to ask 
for leave in the first place.54 In Cash, the medical condition disclosure 
was voluntary;55 in Doe, the medical condition disclosure was 
involuntary.56 This small chronological difference, requested after 
initial time-off request versus requested at the same time as initial 
time-off request, seems too narrow to be an important difference. 
These cases suggest that the distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary disclosures is difficult to determine, leading to the 
conclusion that courts should not be distinguishing between them. 
In addition, the strict-ceiling interpretation that the ADA only 
protects involuntary disclosures connected to employer medical 
inquiries would not protect other circumstances where employers 
gain medical information from sources other than the employee. 
None of these cases address the ADA legislative history or the 
reasoning behind the EEOC guidelines.  
IV. EEOC V. C.R. ENGLAND 
The Tenth Circuit continued this trend of holding that the ADA 
does not protect an employee’s voluntary disclosures to his 
supervisor. It reasoned that even if the disclosed information gives  
 
 
 50. Id. at 1307–08. 
 51. 317 F.3d 339, 341 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 52. Id. at 344–45. 
 53. 231 F.3d at 1304, 1307. 
 54. 317 F.3d at 341. 
 55. 231 F.3d at 1307. 
 56. 317 F.3d at 341. 
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other employees the opportunity to discriminate or harass, voluntary 
disclosures are still not protected. 
A. Facts 
Walter Watson was diagnosed with HIV in 1999 and started 
working for the trucking company C.R. England (CRE) in 2002.57 
He signed an agreement to become an independent contractor and 
began leasing a truck from CRE’s sister company about one month 
after beginning work at CRE.58 Watson voluntarily told CRE’s 
human resources manager, Carrie Johansen, that he was HIV 
positive, mainly because he believed that a driver with whom he had 
had a confrontation had already informed her,59 perhaps in an effort 
to control the damage. 
Although she had previously assured Watson of confidentiality, 
Johansen pulled him aside during his “train-the-trainer” sessions to 
express her concerns and later arranged a meeting with both Watson 
and CRE’s legal counsel.60 Legal counsel suggested that potential 
trainees should know about Watson’s HIV-positive status and asked 
for Watson’s input on how this could be accomplished.61 Watson 
suggested a form, which CRE’s attorney later drafted, that informed 
potential trainees that their trainer was HIV positive.62 This form did 
not specifically name Watson.63  Potential trainees would have the 
opportunity to reject the HIV-positive trainer without knowing 
specifically who it was, but those who signed the form would be 
assigned to Watson,64 thus suggesting that Watson was the trainer 
with HIV. Watson never told CRE about any objections to telling 
others about his HIV or about using the trainee form.65 His one 
trainee, Eddie Seastrunk, signed the form without complaint.66 
However, Watson’s first trip as a trainer did not go well and he was 
fired one week after being assigned a trainee.67 
 
 57. EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1032 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at n.1. 
 60. Id. at 1033. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. (showing that only Watson’s potential trainees were given the opportunity to 
sign the form and it was not given to every trainee). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1033–34. 
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Watson filed a complaint with the EEOC, which in turn found 
that CRE violated Watson’s rights under the ADA by disclosing his 
HIV and by requiring Watson to disclose it to potential trainees.68 
However, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
CRE.69 
B. Tenth Circuit Analysis 
The Tenth Circuit ultimately upheld the summary judgment in 
favor of CRE, holding that the ADA does not apply to voluntarily 
disclosed medical information, even if it relates to a disability.70 
Although the court made eight holdings in this case, only the 
decision regarding whether the ADA protects voluntary disclosures 
will be discussed in this Note. The court interpreted § 12112 of the 
ADA, stating that it was meant to cover “medical examinations and 
inquiries”71 performed “(a) preemployment; (b) post-offer; and (c) 
during the employment relationship.”72 The court also reasoned that 
any medical information gathered as part of a legitimate inquiry has 
to be treated as a confidential medical record and “maintained on 
separate forms and in separate medical files.”73 Any disclosure of that 
confidential medical record would be actionable under the ADA.74 
In this case, however, the court held that Watson’s voluntary 
admission made those statute sections inapplicable.75 The only 
voluntary information that the statute protects, according to the 
court’s interpretation, is information “elicited during an authorized 
employment-related medical examination or inquiry.”76 The court 
reasoned that because the statute does not address voluntarily given 
information from an employee, “it perforce cannot be interpreted as 
extending the protections of 102(d)’s confidentiality restrictions.”77 
The court explained that although the “co-worker consent policy” 
may have violated the ADA,78 the voluntary disclosure and lack of  
 
 
 68. Id. at 1035. 
 69. Id. at 1036. 
 70. Id. at 1046. 
 71. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72. Id. (citations omitted). 
 73. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.14(c)(1), (d)(1) (2011)). 
 74. Id. at 1046–47. 
 75. Id. at 1047. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1042. 
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adverse employment action in this particular case absolved CRE from 
liability.79 
V. ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The Tenth Circuit’s holding is contrary to congressional intent, 
agency interpretation, and public policy. Because Congress specified 
that the ADA would protect people who self-identified as disabled to 
prove ADA compliance, it seems that Congress might have wanted 
to protect all voluntary disclosures. The court rejected the easy-to-
apply EEOC guidelines that do not draw distinctions between 
voluntary and involuntary disclosures; its holding will instead add to 
the current confusion about what disclosures are protected. Finally, 
its holding will discourage voluntary disclosure because those with 
medical problems will not share that information with their employer 
in the early stages before problems arise.  This will lead to a less 
productive disabled workforce, which is against public policy. 
A. Contrary to Congressional Intent 
The Tenth Circuit’s holding that voluntary disclosures are not 
protected under the ADA is contrary to Congress’s intent. The 
legislative history indicates that Congress intended medical 
information to stay confidential; employers could not use the 
medical information to “prevent[] occupational advancement.”80 
Legislators were also concerned that employees would be 
stigmatized if employers could ask about health status without a 
legitimate purpose.81 The ADA permits employers to ask employees 
to self-identify as a person with a disability for purposes of showing 
compliance with the ADA or other government programs, but any 
solicitation for these identifications must note that the disability 
information will be kept confidential.82 The requirement that 
employers keep this self-identifying information confidential seems 
to suggest that Congress might have wanted to protect all voluntary 
 
 79. Id. at 1039–40, n.12. 
 80. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 75 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
357. 
 81. Id. at 75–76, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 357–58. As an example, 
Congress noted that if a person started losing hair, it would be inappropriate for the employer 
to require the employee to be tested for cancer unless that test was “job-related.” Id. at 75, 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 357. Since people suffering from cancer are viewed as 
disabled, this unnecessary inquiry would make the employee feel the “blatant and subtle 
stigma” from being labeled disabled. Id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 358. 
 82. Id. 
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disclosures about disabilities. Although many companies have private 
policies that condemn disclosures of private employee information,83 
Congress still wrote confidentiality provisions into the ADA, 
suggesting that Congress believed federal protection of disability 
information was necessary because private employer actions were 
inadequate. 
While there may be some argument that Congress did not intend 
to bind employers when employees voluntarily disclose medical 
information, certain employee actions already trigger ADA 
consequences without the employer taking the first step.84 Congress 
hoped that employees and employers would engage in “an 
interactive process that requires participation by both sides” when 
working out reasonable accommodations for disabilities,85 a process 
that necessarily demands trust on both sides. Thus, an interpretation 
of the ADA that gives employees reason to trust their employers 
when deciding whether to divulge confidential disability information 
prior to asking for a reasonable accommodation seems more in line 
with congressional intent. 
B. Contrary to Agency Interpretation 
By interpreting the ADA contrary to agency interpretation, the 
Tenth Circuit has chosen to reinforce a confusing outcome at the 
expense of a simple solution. Because the statute was silent in regards 
to medical information gained outside of employer-instigated 
inquiries, the EEOC interpreted the statute as protecting voluntary 
disclosures.86 Protecting all disclosures of medical information 
provided an easier-to-apply standard that trying to decide when the 
disclosure was truly voluntary and thus covered under the ADA.  
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that this interpretation was not 
correct because it was contrary to the plain language of the statute.87 
While the court acknowledged that the EEOC’s interpretation 
“constitute[s] a body of experience and informed judgment to which 
 
 83. See, e.g., Ross v. Advance Am. Cash Advance Ctrs., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 
1028 (E.D. Ark. 2009) (concluding that Ross’s supervisor violated company policy when he 
disclosed her condition). 
 84. See C.R. England, 644 F.3d at 1048–50 (analyzing whether Watson’s actions 
invoked the need for CRE to offer reasonable accommodations). 
 85. Bartee v. Michelin N. Am., 374 F.3d 906, 913 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting 
Templeton v. Neodata Servs. Inc., 162 F.3d 617, 619 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 86. EEOC, supra note 30. 
 87. C.R. England, 644 F.3d at 1047 n.16. 
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courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance,”88 that was not 
enough to persuade the court to protect voluntary disclosures. 
Rather than discussing how the court’s interpretation created better 
outcomes than the EEOC’s, the Tenth Circuit only states that the 
agency interpretation is not controlling and appears to be internally 
inconsistent.89  
C. Contrary to Public Policy 
The Tenth Circuit’s holding creates bad policy for employees 
and employers. Disabled employees, fearing the stigma of coworkers, 
will not openly discuss their medical conditions until their job 
performance starts to suffer. Its holding also insulates employers who 
enable discrimination and harassment through sharing information. 
Finally, only bad public policy would hold that an employee forfeits 
all interests in confidentiality by telling their supervisor about a 
potential problem. 
Holding that an employer has no obligation under the ADA to 
keep voluntarily-disclosed information confidential discourages 
employees from seeking reasonable accommodations and might lead 
to decreased workplace effectiveness for those who need 
accommodations. Employees receive accommodations to help them 
perform their jobs. If employees know that their employer has no 
duty to keep their information private, those who fear stigma and 
harassment will not approach their supervisors. Thus, they will not 
get the accommodations they need to perform their jobs well. Rather 
than opening the discourse with their employer early, trusting in the 
ADA’s confidentiality protection, these employees will only ask for a 
reasonable accommodation as a last resort. Work performed without 
the reasonable accommodation will be less effective than work 
performed with the needed accommodation.  
In addition, this holding insulates employers who distribute 
information that permits other employees to discriminate on the 
basis of disabilities. Sharing medical information allows other 
employees to discriminate based on information they would not have 
otherwise had. Discrimination often leads to harassment,90 
 
 88. Id. (quoting Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. 180 F.3d 1154, 1165 n.5 (10th Cir. 
1999)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See, e.g., Shaver v. Independent Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2003) (where 
coworkers called Shaver “platehead” and treated him condescendingly after his supervisor 
disclosed Shaver’s medical information). 
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something that employers should be held liable for facilitating 
through information distribution. While the Tenth Circuit 
acknowledged that this situation might violate the ADA in certain 
circumstances,91 its holding clearly allows this very type of situation 
to occur. 
It is also bad public policy to argue that employees forfeit all 
interests in confidentiality when they speak confidentially to 
supervisors about medical problems. Employees have the greatest 
claim to confidentiality when an employer solicits information, as 
seen in the number of cases protecting medical information even 
when the employee is not necessarily disabled.92 But employees do 
not authorize a supervisor to share that information purely because 
they proactively told their supervisors about potential problems 
before their employer asked. Regardless of whether the employer or 
the employee initiated the conversation regarding disabilities, the 
possible stigma connected to disability remains the same. 
 Since the Tenth Circuit’s holding in EEOC v. C.R. England is 
contrary to congressional intent, agency interpretation, and good 
workplace public policy, future circuit courts examining whether the 
ADA protects voluntary disclosures should approach the issue 
differently. Future holdings that examine congressional intentions, 
and account for agency interpretations will result in better workplace 
public policy.  
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Future courts examining whether the ADA protects medical 
information should choose solutions that protect employee medical 
information while still giving employers easy-to-apply standards with 
predictable results. One obvious solution is for employers to keep all 
medical information, especially about potential disabilities, 
confidential according to the guidelines set out by the EEOC. 
Practitioners have interpreted the provisions allowing disclosure to 
include the following recipients: 1) other supervisors, who may be 
told about the disability as needed to provide reasonable 
accommodations or allow medical leave; 2) emergency personnel, 
who may know for purposes of medical treatment; 3) government 
officials, who may obtain information to investigate compliance with 
the ADA and state workers’ compensation laws; and 4) insurance 
 
 91. C.R. England, 644 F.3d at 1042. 
 92. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 n.1 (2011) (citing cases that have held that plaintiffs have a 
cause of action under ADA if information from an acceptable inquiry is divulged). 
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companies, who may know for insurance purposes.93 These narrow 
exceptions would allow the employee to control who would know 
about the disability and provide legal remedy for workplace 
harassment.94 
Another possible solution is to allow employers to divulge 
voluntarily disclosed medical information only if it is “job-related 
and consistent with business necessity.”95 Thus, employers can tell 
fellow employees about the condition where there are safety 
concerns due to specific job conditions. Employer actions, such as 
the emergency protocol for seizures in Lanxon v. Crete Carrier 
Corp.,96 could possibly fit the job-related requirement, helping more 
employers feel comfortable about working with those who have 
disabilities because they can inform other employees about a 
particular disability when it is a business necessity without violating 
the ADA. Having this requirement in place would discourage 
employer divulgences that serve no purpose except providing fodder 
for workplace gossip, such as the “ill-mannered” disclosure of an 
employee’s mental illness in Ross v. Advance America Cash Advance 
Centers, Inc.97 
Here, even if CRE had argued that the disclosure forms were 
related to a business necessity, that of keeping other drivers from 
contracting a contagious disease, this would be a flimsy excuse at 
best. The EEOC states that a “direct threat due to a medical 
condition must be based on objective evidence obtained, or 
reasonably available to the employer” and specifically addresses the 
objective threat posed by an employee with HIV.98 EEOC v. C.R. 
England did not have any of those justifications for requiring HIV 
disclosure.99  
 
 93. GOREN, supra note 48, at 41; see also Scott L. Fast, Comment, Breach of Employee 
Confidentiality: Moving Toward a Common-Law Tort Remedy, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 433 
(1993) (discussing the need for employees to feel that they have some control over the 
sensitive information held by their employers). 
 94. For examples of workplace harassment for disabilities that do not rise to the level of 
actionable “hostile environment,” see MARK C. WEBER, DISABILITY HARASSMENT 34 (2007). 
While many courts have recognized that there is a cause of action available under the ADA for 
a hostile work environment, few cases survive summary judgment. Brian L. Porto, Annotation, 
Actions Under Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.), to Remedy Alleged 
Harassment or Hostile Work Environment, 162 A.L.R. FED. 603 (2011). 
 95. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c) (2011) 
 96. See supra text accompanying notes 37–38. 
 97. See supra text accompanying notes 43–46. 
 98. EEOC, supra note 30. 
 99. See id. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
In holding that an employee’s voluntary disclosures about 
disabilities are not confidential, the Tenth Circuit discouraged 
voluntary discourse about disabilities, leading to a less-effective 
disabled workforce in general. Its holding betrays the intentions of 
Congress in passing the Americans with Disabilities Act, which 
envisioned open communication and interaction about disabilities 
between employers and employees. Its holding also creates bad 
incentives for employees, who might delay telling supervisors about 
disabilities for the fear of stigma brought about if an employer 
divulges the information. If, instead, the Tenth Circuit had held that 
medical information obtained from voluntary disclosures must be 
protected like medical information obtained through accepted 
methods, then employees would have more control over who 
receives their information. Alternatively, the Tenth Circuit could 
have held that voluntarily-disclosed medical information can be 
shared when the justification is “job-related and consistent with 
business necessity,” allowing employers to share the information 
more readily, but still allowing some protection to the employee. 
Future courts who consider whether the ADA protects voluntary 
disclosures should consider congressional intent, the reasoning 
behind the EEOC guidelines, and the public policy that their 
decisions will encourage.   
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